THE ROAD TO GERMAN AGGRESSION

On September 1, a year will elapse since the solemn announcement of the "Report on the Losses Sustained by Poland as a Result of German Aggression and Occupation during The Second World War, 1939-1945". The choice of date was not accidental. This very day was the anniversary of Germany's attack on Poland in September 1939.

1.

This aggression was an inevitable consequence of the attitude of German leadership circles regardless of the programmes of their parties. The Polish statehood, restored in 1918, was a thorn in the side of both the German conservatives, the Kremlin-moderated communists and the National Socialists gathered around Adolf Hitler.

Chief of the Reichswer General Staff Gen. Hans von Seeckt used to say that the very existence of Poland was unbearable for them.

The suppression of Polish statehood was to be supported by, among others, the customs war unleashed by the German side (1925-1929) and cooperation with the Soviet Union, initiated by the agreement in Rapallo on April 16, 1922.

After the National Socialists came to power in Germany, Hitler decided to make conciliatory gestures towards Poland. This was manifested primarily by the conclusion of the Polish-German declaration on non-violence in mutual relations on 26 January 1934. On the part of the German leader, however, this was a game of appearances, calculated to neutralise Poland until the Third Reich was ready to undertake territorial expansion.

2.

Polish leadership circles led by Marshal Józef Piłsudski were aware of the transient nature of this agreement. In "Mein Kampf", Hitler defined the conquest of the so-called living space (German lebensraum) in the east as one of the priorities of German politics. However, in the absence of interest from France and Britain in pre-emptive halting of German inclinations, Piłsudski accepted an agreement with Berlin. According to his predictions, it was to last for four to five years.

The accuracy of the Polish leader's intuition was confirmed in the autumn of 1937 by the dictator of the Third Reich himself. He then announced to representatives of the German general staff that war with Poland was inevitable. Moreover, he stated that he was already convinced of this when he concluded the aforementioned agreement of 1934. It was therefore merely a camouflage of his actual intentions.

3.

On 24 October 1938, the Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop, handed over to the Polish Ambassador Józef Lipski German proposals that were to lead to a "complete solution" (Gesamtlösung) of the problems that existed in Polish-German relations.  

These included the incorporation of the Free City of Danzig into the Third Reich, the construction of an extraterritorial highway from Germany to East Prussia through Polish Danzig Pomerania (referred to in German propaganda as a "corridor") and the accession of the Polish side to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

In Warsaw, it was well known that this was only the beginning of German demands, ultimately aimed at a significant territorial truncation of the Republic of Poland and its full subordination to the interests of the Third Reich. Hence, in January 1939, during a meeting at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, the highest circle of Polish authorities decided to reject German demands.

4.

 

 

 

After the Munich Agreement collapsed (29-30 September 1938) and Germany annexed Bohemia (March 14, 1939), it became obvious that all Hitler's declarations were worthless. The British (and soon afterwards French) declarations on the guarantee of Poland's state existence (March 31, 1939) proved a pretext for Hitler to break the 1934 agreement with the Republic of Poland, which took place on April 28, 1939.

In parallel, the head of German diplomacy, Joachim von Ribbentrop, began efforts to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Without this agreement, a German invasion of Poland would have posed a much greater risk to Hitler. This pact, at Hitler's specific request addressed directly to Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, was concluded in Moscow on August 23, 1939.

 

 

 

 

5.

The day before, during a briefing in Berchtesgaden, Hitler demanded full ruthlessness from the German general staff in the war against Poland scheduled for August 26. As he was to state at the time: "The purpose of war is not to reach some geographical line, but to physically exterminate the enemies". At the same time, he added that "[...] it is only through this route that we can gain the living space we need".

As a result of the conclusion of the alliance between Poland and Great Britain (August 25, 1939), Hitler decided to suspend the aggression planned for the following day. Indeed, the unyielding stance of UK diplomacy came as a considerable surprise to him. As time proved not for long and already on September 1, 1939, the German war machine was set in motion.

Thus, the Second World War began, the bloodiest conflict in the history of humankind to date. Presented on the anniversaries of its commencement, the "Report on the Losses Sustained by Poland as a Result of German Aggression and Occupation during The Second World War, 1939-1945" is a special testimony to the devastating nature of the hecatomb unleashed by the Germans (with significant Soviet complicity), which cost the lives of more than five million Polish citizens.

6.

Selected references:

J. Beck, Ostatni raport, Warszawa 1987 

I. Dawvin, Mon voisin, cet ennemi. La politique de sécurité française face aux relations polono-tchécoslovaques entre 1919 et 1939, Bruxelles-Bern-Berli-Frankfurt am Main-New York-Oxford-Wien 2009

J. C. Fest, Hitler t. II: Führer, Warszawa 1996

K. Grünberg, Polska karta Stalina, Toruń 1991

M. Jabłonowski, P. Stawecki, Edward Śmigły-Rydz. Następca Komendanta. Materiały do biografii, Warszawa 2013

J. Karski, Wielkie mocarstwa wobec Polski 1919-1945. Od Wersalu do Jałty, Lublin 1998

I. Kershaw, Hitler t.2 cz.1: 1936-1941. Nemesis, Poznań 2003 

Płk Józef Beck (1894-1944). Żołnierz, dyplomata, polityk, red. S. M. Nowinowski, Łódź-Warszawa 2017

A.L. Sowa, U progu wojny. Z dziejów spraw wewnętrznych i polityki zagranicznej II Rzeczypospolitej, Kraków 1997

W. Suleja, Józef Piłsudski, Wrocław 2004  

M. Wańkowicz, Strzępy epopei. Szpital w Cichiniczach. Wrzesień żagwiący. Po klęsce, Warszawa 2009